Quanto de patrimonio os bancos americanos tem em relacao ao GDP?


Quanto de patrimonio os bancos americanos tem em relacao ao GDP?

Este grafico do Federal Reserve Bank de Atlanta nos da uma boa ideia:



Um pensamento central em discussao e que os bancos nao devem ter em patrimonio mais do que 2% do GDP, o que nao e o caso hoje.

Se o Banco Wells Fargo retem 10% do GDP (1.7 trilhoes de dolares) entao o GDP esta em torno de 17 trilhoes nos EUA


Este artigo fo FRB de Atlanta e muito interessante pois discute o conceito de “E muito grande para falir” baseado no bank bail out realizado em 1984 nos EUA.


“…What we can learn about bank size from the Continental Illinois experience is a little more complicated. Continental Illinois was the seventh-largest bank in the United States when it failed and was clearly regarded at that time as being a very large bank. Thus, we need some metric as to what’s too large. One such metric was recently provided by MIT Professor Simon Johnson at a Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis symposium titled Ending Too Big to Fail. Johnson argued that we should cap individual banks’ assets at no more than 2 percent of GDP. As table 1 shows, by this standard many contemporary banks would need to be split into many parts.

[grafico acima]

…”…However, proportionate to GDP, Continental was much smaller than the largest contemporary banks. Table 2 provides the ratio of assets to GDP for the large bank holding companies as of year-end 1983.7 Continental Illinois would easily have been in compliance with Professor Johnson’s test with assets equal to only 1.1 percent of GDP. Indeed, only three banks would have failed the test. However, Sprague says that from the vantage point of 1984, the possibility that a failing Continental would cause two other large banks to fail was “of even more concern” than some correspondent bank failures.



What lessons can be drawn from Continental?
One focus of the contemporary debate over ending TBTF is structural changes intended to return banks to the days when they were smaller and focused on traditional commercial banking activities. A way of evaluating the importance of these structural changes to TBTF is to return to the collapse and resulting bailout that helped popularize that phrase, that of Continental Illinois in 1984. We learn from going back to 1984 that a banking crisis with TBTF could happen at a time when banks were focused on traditional commercial banking activities, were not interconnected through OTC derivatives, and were proportionately much smaller than those in the recent crisis. Thus, while reversing the structural changes in banking may (or may not) make TBTF less likely in the future, structural measures by themselves are likely insufficient to end TBTF.

What Continental’s bailout does do is remind us that the decision on whether to bail out a bank is not just about the direct fallout from its failure but also on the potential indirect consequences for the stability of funding at other banks. In this respect, Continental’s bailout was similar to the recent crisis in which the problem was not so much the weakness of any individual bank but rather the weakness of almost all of the major banks. If we want to end TBTF, past experience says we somehow have to address the problem of having too many (large) banks that fail at the same time…”












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